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Several high-profile negative events involving Muslim perpetrators have recently been 
covered by the media. We investigated whether the same negative actions are more likely to 
be labeled ‘terrorism’ when they are committed by Muslims than when they are committed 
by White non-Muslims. In Experiment 1 (n = 60), using a real article about a Muslim 
perpetrator and a modified version about a non-Muslim perpetrator, we found that 
participants were more likely to identify a crime as terrorism when it was perpetrated by a 
Muslim. The label ‘terrorism’ also mediated the effect of Muslim identity on negative 
judgments of the behavior. In Experiment 2 (n = 60) we replicated the results of Experiment 
1 and clarified that the effects persisted when we used a real article about a non-Muslim 
perpetrator and a modified version about a Muslim perpetrator. We discuss implications for 
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Introduction 
Recently, several stories in the news media have drawn a connection between 
Muslims and terrorism1–4. This negative media attention is associated with a variety of 
adverse outcomes including increased prejudice against Muslims in general5,6. However, 
another concern is the potential identity-based bias in the usage of the label ‘terrorism’. 
Specifically, some argue that Muslim perpetrators are more likely to be labeled terrorists than 
White, non-Muslim perpetrators, even if their behaviors are not meaningfully different7,8. In 
two experiments this research investigates this potential labeling bias and compares two 
possible explanations for its occurrence.  
Muslims and Mass Killings in the Media 
Several recent, high-profile mass killing events involving Muslims as perpetrators 
have received considerable attention in the Western media. This includes, but is not limited 
to, a 17-hour hostage situation in Sydney, Australia in which 2 hostages died1, the killing of 
12 Charlie Hedbo employees in Paris in January, 20152, the killing of a further 130 people in 
central Paris and near the Stade de France in November, 20154, the killing of 147 people at a 
University in Garissa, Kenya in April 20159, and the continued dangerous and destructive rise 
of the so called ‘Islamic State’ in Palmyra, Syria 3. 
           These media portrayals have the potential to increase prejudice against Muslims as a 
group, despite Muslims’ extremely limited involvement in and support for mass killings 5,6,10. 
For example, one study found that a mere 12 minutes of exposure to terrorism-themed news 
sufficed to increase prejudice against Arabs in general11. Beyond these negative effects, 
however, some have argued that reports about mass killings are themselves biased: 
specifically that the label ‘terrorism’ is more readily applied to killings perpetrated by 
Muslims than those perpetrated by non-Muslims.  
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Terrorism is difficult to define; Schmid and Jongman list 109 distinct definitions of 
terrorism12. However, most of these definitions offer 4 identifying features: the use of force 
or violence; targeting non-combatants; attempts to influence an audience beyond or larger 
than the victims themselves; and using violence as a means to an end. In the United States a 
large and growing number of mass shootings occur each year. As of October 1st, 2015, there 
had been 294 mass shootings in that year alone, several of which fit all 4 criteria13. However, 
when these acts are carried out by White non-Muslims, they tend not to be referred to as 
terrorism.  
A recent, noteworthy example is that of Robert Lewis Dear, a White, conservative 
Christian who attacked a Planned Parenthood, killing 3 people and injuring 9 others, for 
apparently political reasons (i.e., an opposition to abortions). Former governor Michael 
Huckabee labeled the incident an act of domestic terrorism, but Senator and potential 2016 
presidential candidate Rafeel Edward “Ted” Cruz did not, explicitly stating a belief that 
Christians do not commit acts of terrorism7. An article in the Huffington post makes this 
accusation of bias in labeling explicit8: “Why isn't "terrorism" applied? Because the killer is a 
White Christian. Only Brown Muslims can be terrorists.” 
Terrorists because they are Bad or Bad because they are Terrorists? 
This current research investigated whether this double-standard in labeling occurs, as 
well as two possible explanations for it. According to Social Identity Theory, we have social, 
group-based identities as well as personal, individual identities, and we are motivated to see 
our own groups in a positive light14. Consequently, we tend to judge members of our own 
groups more positively than members of other groups. For example, one experiment found 
that White mock jurors judged Black defendants as guiltier, more violent and more 
aggressive than White defendants 15. Similar experiments have also found that White Dutch 
children judged the same behavior more negatively if it was perpetrated by a Turkish-Dutch 
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child than if it was perpetrated by a White Dutch child16, and that participants ascribed more 
negative motives to politicians’ behaviors if these politicians did not agree with the 
participants’ own political views 17. Particularly relevant to this research, a cross-sectional 
study found that both Palestinian and Jewish Israelis were less likely to judge their ingroup’s 
behavior as terrorism, and more likely to judge the others’ behavior as terrorism 18. If the bias 
in the use of the terrorism label is primarily based on social identity concerns, a more 
negative judgment of Muslims’ behaviors should drive the use of the terrorism label.  
However, it is possible that the process is driven more by stereotype activation rather 
than social identity processes. If one is aware of the stereotypes of a particular group, the 
mere presence of members of that group, or of characteristics attributed to the group, may 
activate related stereotypes in a way that need not be conscious or deliberate 19. For example, 
a recent experiment found that participants showed higher anti-Arab attitudes after playing a 
terrorism themed game, despite the fact that there were no Arab characters in the video game 
itself 20. If the bias in the use of the terrorism label is primarily based on social stereotype 
activation, the use of the terrorism label should precede, and may lead to, a more negative 
judgment of Muslims’ behaviors. 
 Though prior research has investigated other forms of bias in labeling and judgments 
of behaviors, no empirical research to date has investigated whether the same actions are 
more likely to be labeled as terrorism if they are perpetrated by Muslims, nor investigated 
(i.e., compared) the two proposed explanations for this effect. We fill this gap in the literature 
in two studies described below.  
Current Research and Hypotheses 
            We expected that attacks carried out by Muslims (rather than by White non-Muslims) 
would be more likely to be labeled ‘terrorism’ and that this effect was due to the activation of 
the terrorist label rather than the increased negative judgments of the behaviors. Specifically, 
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in two experiments all participants read about the same attack, but half the participants were 
told that the perpetrator was Muslim while the other half were told that the perpetrator was a 
White non-Muslim. Despite the fact that the behaviors were same, we hypothesized that 
participants would judge the Muslim’s behaviors more negatively and that this effect would 
be mediated by an increased tendency to label the behaviors ‘terrorism’.  
Experiment 1 
Method 
             Participants and design. Sixty White, non-Muslim, British people (i.e., a non-
student sample) living in London (29 males, 31 females, mean age = 22.47, SD = 3.49) were 
randomly assigned to read either (1) a newspaper article about a terrorist attack perpetrated 
by a Muslim (Muslim perpetrator condition), or (2) to read an almost identical article about a 
terrorist attack perpetrated by a White non-Muslim (non-Muslim perpetrator condition). This 
sample size was based on prior research that used a similar paradigm to investigate anti-Black 
prejudice15. All participants then indicated the extent to which they considered the 
perpetrator’s behavior to be terrorism and reported their judgments of the perpetrators’ 
behavior. After completing these measures, all participants were thanked and debriefed. 
Materials and Procedure. We used a real newspaper article21 as the stimulus. This 
349-word article described a plot by a Muslim-American soldier, Jason Abdo, to use an 
explosive to kill other American soldiers. Participants in the Muslim perpetrator condition 
were given this article unedited. Participants in the White non-Muslim perpetrator condition 
were given an edited version of this article that was exactly the same, except that the 
necessary information was altered to change the perpetrator from a Muslim to a White non-
Muslim. For example, the name “Naser Jason Abdo” was changed to “James Douglas Ross” 
and his religion was changed from “Muslim” to “Christian”. Otherwise the article and the 
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actions described in it were exactly the same. All participants were given 5 minutes to read 
the stimulus material before completing the dependent measures. 
To indicate whether they perceived the perpetrator’s behaviors to be terrorism, 
participants responded on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Not at all, 7 = Very much) to the single 
item: “Do you consider the behaviors described in this article to be terrorism?” To report 
their (negative) judgments of the behaviors described in the articles participants indicated 
their agreement on 7-point Likert scales (1= Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree) with the 
following three statements (α = .64): “I see the behaviors described in the article as negative 
behavior”, “The behaviors in the article could be justified” (reversed), “The behaviors 
described in the article could have reasonable explanations” (reversed). Though scale 
reliability did not quite reach recommended cut-off values (i.e., α = .70), all items loaded well 
onto a single factor (.67 < λ < .85) and item deletion did not improve scale reliability, so all 
three items were retained. To control for possible order effects the order in which participants 
completed the dependent measures was randomized. Correlations between variables were not 
high enough to suggest multi-collinearity (.16 < r < .58), thus all variables were used as 
described. While completing these measures participants were not aware that there were 
multiple conditions, nor were they aware that this experiment aimed to compare responses to 
Muslim and White non-Muslim perpetrators. Only after completing the questionnaires were 
participants were debriefed in full. 
Results and Discussion 
Male and female participants were not unevenly distributed across conditions 
(Fisher’s Exact Test, p = .61), nor was there a significant difference in age between the 
Muslim and White non-Muslim conditions; M = 23.27 vs. M = 21.68, t (58) = 1.81, p = .08. 
We therefore did not include either age or gender as predictors in the subsequent analyses.  
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Differences between conditions. The means and standard deviations of both 
dependent variables are shown in Table 1; correlations between variables are shown in Table 
2. As predicted, though the behaviors were exactly the same, participants were more likely to 
perceive the behaviors as terrorism if they were carried out by a Muslim perpetrator (M = 
5.87, SD = 1.59) than if they were carried out by a White, non-Muslim perpetrator (M = 3.80, 
SD = 1.86); t (58) = 4.62, p < .001, d = 1.2. However, Muslim identity did not directly lead to 
a more negative assessment of the perpetrator’s behavior; (M = 5.24, SD = 1.12 vs. M = 4.86, 
SD = 1.15), t (58) = 1.28, p = .21, d = .34. 
Mediation analyses. We specifically predicted that the perception of the Muslim 
perpetrator’s behavior as terrorism would mediate the relationship between ethnicity and 
negative judgment (rather than the negative judgments mediating the relationship between 
ethnicity and perceptions of terrorism). We tested these relationships using PROCESS 
Macros22 (model 4 with 95% confidence intervals based on 1000 bias-corrected bootstrap 
tests; see Figure 1). As expected, we found that (Muslim) perpetrator ethnicity increased 
perceptions of the behaviors as terrorism (b = 1.03, p < .001), which in turn predicted 
negative judgments of the behavior (b = .39, p < .001). Perpetrator ethnicity did not directly 
increase negative judgments of behavior (b = -.21, p = .15). However, perpetrator ethnicity 
indirectly increased negative judgments indirectly via perceptions of the behavior as 
terrorism (LLCI = .23, ULCI = .64, point estimate = .41). 
Furthermore, also as hypothesized, the alternative model was not supported by our 
data because perpetrator ethnicity did not directly increase negative judgments of the 
behavior (b = .19, p = .21). When testing that model, negative judgments of the behavior did 
predict increased perceptions of the behaviors as terrorism (b = .86, p < .001), and perpetrator 
ethnicity also directly increased perceptions of the behaviors as terrorism (b = .87, p < .001). 
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However, perpetrator ethnicity did not increase perceptions of terrorism indirectly via 
negative judgments of behavior (LLCI = -.06, ULCI = .45, point estimate = .17). 
In sum, our results supported our hypotheses. Despite identical behaviors, Muslim 
perpetrators were more likely to be perceived as terrorists, which led to increased negative 
judgments of their behaviors. We were also able to rule out the alternative hypothesis, i.e., 
that Muslim behaviors are judged more harshly which leads to increased perceptions of their 
behaviors as terrorism.  
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2 we sought to rule out the possibility that the effects found in 
Experiment 1 were due to some unaccounted-for characteristic of the original article 
(compared to the modified article). In Experiment 1 we took great care to ensure that the 2 
articles were identical, except for the information necessary to alter the ethnicity of the 
perpetrator. Nonetheless, it remains possible that the original article (which was in fact 
genuine) seemed more realistic or credible to the participants. Alternatively, the original 
article may have been received differently because participants may have remembered the 
events to which it referred. To rule out these explanations for our findings, Experiment 2 was 
a replication of Experiment 1, except that the article containing the White, non-Muslim 
perpetrator was the original, unedited article, while the article containing the Muslim 
perpetrator was the modified version of the article.  
Method 
    Participants. As in Experiment 1, sixty White, non-Muslim, British people (i.e., a 
non-student sample) living in London (20 males, 40 females, mean age = 21.20, SD = 3.48) 
were randomly assigned to read a newspaper article about an attack perpetrated by a White 
non-Muslim, or to read an almost identical article about an attack perpetrated by a Muslim. 
All participants then indicated the extent to which they considered the perpetrator’s behavior 
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to be terrorism and reported their judgments of the perpetrators’ behavior. After completing 
these measures, all participants were thanked and debriefed. 
Materials and procedure. As in Experiment 1, all participants were given 5 minutes 
to read the stimulus material. We used a real newspaper article23. This 304-word article 
described the Oslo Bombings and Utoya Attack committed by Anders Breivik: a White, 
Christian Norwegian. Participants in the White non-Muslim perpetrator condition were given 
this article unedited. Participants in the Muslim perpetrator condition were given an edited 
version of this article that was exactly the same as the original, except that the necessary 
information had been altered to change the perpetrator from a non-Muslim to a Muslim. For 
example, the name “Anders Breivik” was changed to “Abu Abbas” and the description 
“blond, blue-eyed, right-wing Christian” was changed to “brown haired, brown-eyed, right-
wing Muslim”. Otherwise the article and the actions described in it were exactly the same. 
After reading their assigned articles, participants completed the same measures used 
in Experiment 1: the single-item measure of perceptions of the behavior as terrorism, and the 
3-item measure of negative judgment of the perpetrator’s behaviors (α = .78). As in the 
previous experiment, the order of presentation of the measures was randomized and 
participants were not aware that there were multiple conditions or that the experiment aimed 
to compare responses to non-Muslims and responses to Muslims. After completing the 
questionnaires participants were debriefed in full. 
Results and Discussion 
   Male and female participants were not unevenly distributed across conditions 
(Fisher’s Exact Test, p = 1.00), nor was there any difference in age between the non-Muslim 
and Muslim conditions; M = 20.70 vs. M = 21.70, t (58) = .1.12, p = .27. We therefore did not 
include either age or gender as predictors in the analyses that follow. 
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            Differences between conditions. The means and standard deviations of both 
dependent variables are shown in Table 3 and correlations between variables are shown in 
Table 4. As predicted, despite the fact that the behaviors were exactly the same, participants 
were more likely to perceive the behaviors as terrorism if they were carried out by a Muslim 
perpetrator (M = 5.87, SD = 1.55) than if they were carried out by a White, non-Muslim 
perpetrator (M = 4.77, SD = 2.22); t (58) = 2.22, p = .030, d = .58. In this experiment 
participants also judged the behaviors more negatively when they were committed by a 
Muslim perpetrator (M = 5.86, SD = 1.21) than when they were committed by a White, non-
Muslim perpetrator (M = 5.03, SD = 1.68); t (58) = 2.17, p = .034, d = .58. 
           Mediation analyses. Again, we specifically predicted that the perception of the 
Muslim perpetrator’s behavior as terrorism would mediate the relationship between ethnicity 
and negative judgment. We tested these relationships using PROCESS Macros22 (model 4 
with 95% confidence intervals based on 1000 bias-corrected bootstrap tests; see Figure 2). As 
expected, we found that (Muslim) perpetrator ethnicity increased perceptions of the behaviors 
as terrorism (b = .55, p = .03), which in turn predicted negative judgments of the behavior (b 
= .60, p < .0001). When perceptions of the behavior as terrorism was taken into account, 
perpetrator ethnicity did not directly increase negative judgments of behavior (b = .08, p = 
.52). However, perpetrator ethnicity did increase negative judgments indirectly via 
perceptions of the behavior as terrorism (LLCI = .04, ULCI = .70, point estimate = .33).  
In sum, the results of Experiment 2 also supported our hypotheses. Despite identical 
behaviors, Muslim perpetrators were more likely to be perceived as terrorists, which led to 
increased negative judgments of their behaviors. When the effect of the label ‘terrorism’ was 
taken into account, the perpetrator’s Muslim identity only had an indirect effect on 
perceptions of the negativity of the behaviors.  
General Discussion 
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In the wake of numerous, unpredictable mass killings, negative emotional reactions 
are expected. However, it remains important to assess negative behaviors without bias, and to 
avoid racial, ethnic or religious prejudice in our perceptions of, or responses to, these 
negative events. In two experiments we found that White, non-Muslim participants perceived 
the same behaviors more negatively and were more likely to label these behaviors ‘terrorism’ 
if they were done by Muslims, rather than by White non-Muslims. We also found that the 
label, “terrorism”, preceded the more negative judgments of the behavior, rather than the 
reverse. We discuss these findings in relation to study design, limitations, suggestions for 
future research, and implications for representations of Muslims in the media.  
Limitations and Possible Future Research 
This current research has a number of noteworthy strengths. As we used a genuinely 
experimental design, we can make causal conclusions about the relationships between 
Muslim identity, the use of the “terrorism” label, and negative perceptions of the behavior. 
Furthermore, we used real newspaper articles in both experiments, increasing the external 
validity of our findings. Also, much social-psychological research is criticized for the over-
use of non-representative student samples 24,25. Through the use of non-student participant 
samples, we further increased the generalizability of our findings.  
Nonetheless, both experiments do have limitations. Self-presentation biases and 
possible demand characteristics are potential problems for many kinds of social 
psychological research. However, we took care to hide the true hypotheses of the experiments 
from the participants; they were unaware of the number and nature of the conditions in each 
experiment, and had no reason to suspect that comparisons were being made between 
judgments of Muslims and of non-Muslims. Furthermore, if participants were motivated to 
present themselves in a positive, egalitarian light, they should have judged the Muslim 
 Muslim identity and ‘terrorism’ 13 
 
perpetrators less negatively. This would make or pattern of results, in which the Muslim 
perpetrators were judged more negatively, still more significant.  
Though we found evidence of bias against Muslims, we acknowledge that our study 
design may have conflated a number of possible identities. Though we never described any of 
the Muslim perpetrators racially, the use of names like Abu Abbas and Nasser Abdo may 
have suggested non-White perpetrators. As such, religious Muslim identity may have been 
conflated with ethnic identity making it unclear which was primarily responsible for our 
effects. We do not believe that this limits the practical implications of our findings; the real-
world debate about the label of “terrorism” is often concerned with comparisons between 
perpetrators who are non-White and Muslim and those who are White and non-Muslim. 
Nonetheless, future research may wish to disentangle the effects of ethnicity and religion. 
Contrasting the labels applied to, for example, Caucasian Muslims compared to ethnically 
Middle-Eastern Christians might shed important light on the conditions under which the 
terrorist stereotype is activated and the strength of the perceived link between ethnic and 
religious identity.  
Implications 
The question of bias in the use of the label ‘terrorism’ has been publicly raised 
multiple times7,8. However, each mass killing event differs in many ways including the 
perceived motivations behind the attack, the methods used by the perpetrator, and the number 
of people killed or injured. Hence, without controlled experimentation, it was difficult to 
determine whether the religious identity of the perpetrator played a role in the use (or 
avoidance) of the label. By presenting participants with one of two identical stories that 
differed only in the identity of the perpetrator, these two experiments clearly showed that 
religious identity does play a significant role; despite identical behaviors, Muslims are more 
likely to be seen as terrorists and their behaviors are interpreted more negatively.  
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We also found that this bias in labeling precedes the more negative judgments of 
Muslims’ behaviors, rather than being a result of it. The explanatory primacy of the label 
does not detract from the reality of the more negative judgments, which themselves are a 
form of bias against Muslims. Furthermore, this negativity is compounded with other biases, 
such as the media’s tendency to under-represent minorities in positive roles and to over-
represent minority groups as perpetrators of crimes26. Put together, these tendencies 
encourage a climate in which Muslims are represented in very narrow, largely negative ways, 
usually with reference to terrorism. Nonetheless, understanding the importance of stereotype 
activation in this case points to useful interventions that may reduce labeling bias. Certain 
strategies, such as chronic egalitarian goals 19, and counter-stereotypical imagery 27, have 
been shown to reduce stereotype activation. Furthermore, if one understands that stereotype 
activation has occurred, further steps can be taken to prevent that stereotype activation from 
being translated into action28.  
Conclusions 
It might be difficult to provide a clear-cut or objective solution to the problem of anti-
Muslim labeling bias in descriptions of acts of violence. Since the attacks of September 11, 
2001 in the United States, and the subsequent Global War on Terror (Sides & Gross, 2013), 
the term ‘terrorism’ has become an important part of the international vocabulary used to 
describe mass killings 7. It might be difficult or impractical to abandon the term entirely. 
Also, as mentioned before, terrorism is difficult to define consistently, partially due to the 
political and subjective nature of the term 12. Thus, it might also not be possible to provide 
unambiguous, unbiased guidelines for the usage of the term. Nonetheless, these current 
experiments reveal that anti-Muslim prejudice plays an important role in the current choice of 
vocabulary; the same behaviors are more likely to be called terrorism, and judged more 
negatively, when perpetrated by Muslims rather than White non-Muslims. Awareness of this 
 Muslim identity and ‘terrorism’ 15 
 
bias should encourage a certain amount of caution when using or avoiding the label 
“terrorism”.  
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Table 1. Means and standard deviations of outcome variables according to condition in 
Experiment 1 
  Muslim 
 perpetrator  
(original) 
     White non-Muslim  
perpetrator  
(modified)  
    
Perception of behavior as 
terrorism 
5.87 (1.59)  3.80 (1.86) 
Negative judgment of behavior  5.24 (1.12)  4.86 (1.15) 
     
 
Notes: Standard deviations shown in parentheses.  
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Table 2. Correlations between variables in Experiment 1 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 




2. Perception that the behavior is ‘terrorism’  .52*** 1  
3. Negative assessment of the behavior .16 .57*** 1 
 
Notes: (1) Pearson’s r values shown. (2) * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001 
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Table 3. Means and standard deviations of outcome variables according to condition in 
Experiment 2 
 Muslim 
 perpetrator  
(modified) 
     White non-Muslim  
perpetrator  
(original) 
    
Perception of behavior as 
terrorism 
5.87 (1.55)  4.77 (2.22) 
Negative judgment of behavior 5.86 (1.21)  5.03 (1.68) 
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Table 4. Correlations between variables in Experiment 2 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 




2. Perception that the behavior is ‘terrorism’  .28* 1  
3. Negative assessment of the behavior .27* .80*** 1 
 
Notes: (1) Pearson’s r values shown. (2) * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001 
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Figure 1. Mediation model showing the effect of perpetrators’ Muslim identity on participants’ 
negative judgment of behaviors, mediated by perceptions of the behavior as terrorism (Experiment 1). 
 
 
                                                   
      
                                                     
                                                                 













b = 1.03*** b = .39*** 
  b = -.21 
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Figure 2. Mediation model showing the effect of perpetrators’ Muslim identity on participants’ 
negative judgment of behaviors, mediated by perceptions of the behavior as terrorism (Experiment 2).  
 
 
                                                   
 
                                                     
                                                                 
















b = .55* b = .60*** 
  b = .08 
